An investigation into the practical problems inherent in implementing advanced materiel management techniques by Morrow, David F. & Smeds, James H.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1964
An investigation into the practical problems inherent
in implementing advanced materiel management techniques
Morrow, David F.







AH INVESTIGATION INTO THE PRACTICAL














AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
INHERENT IN IMPLEMENTING
ADVANCED MATERIEL MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
-ubllo release;
i unlimited."*•-*- J-M4J. W^U. •
A Research Paper f»" ?«+ **"*f^
Presented to
The Faculty of the Navy Management Seho&l
U. S. Naval Postgraduate School
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science In Management
Appr.r— for public release;'
n unlimited.
By
David F. Morrow, LCDR S
and





U. S. Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, Californ.a
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
INHERENT IN IMPLEMENTING





This work is accepted as fulfilling





United States Naval Postgraduate School

AN INVESTIGATION INTO TH3 PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
INHERENT IN IMPLEMENTING
ADVANCED MATERIEL MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
by
David F. Morrow
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
and
James H. Smeds
Commander, United States Navy-
It may be said that management today is in transition from an
art based largely on intuitive judgment to a science based on recognized
and accepted principles. This transition emphasizes the need for decision
rules which must be communicated to and uniformly applied by operators,
order to achieve management objectives.
Nowhere today is the need more critical nor are better decision
rules more urgent, than in the materiel management field- Weapon systems
have increased in number and complexity, deployment more widespread,, 3
deliveries of supporting material mere urgent, As a result, not only must
more decisions be made, but they must be made faster. Materiel managers
can with years of experience learn to cope with difficult decision problems
;
but trial-and~error learning is expensive. Advanced mathematical decision
models are now and have been available. The basic problem is not develop-
ment but uniform application at all echelons cf management . Implemer:
of uniform decision rules will provide for more effective and economi
supply support and enable top management to establish standards for
measuring performance at all levels
»
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BACKGROUND REVIEW OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED
WITH DEVELOPMENT AMD INTRODUCTION
Q_F_ ADVANCED MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
The past fifteen years have seen a revolution in military
technology characterized by increasingly complex weapon systems- The
increasing number and complexity of weapon systems has severely strained
the capabilities of today's inventory manager. The increasing use of
revolving stock funds for procurement and resale of repair parts
has put additional pressure on the inventory manager to insure that
minimum levels of supply consistent with effective support are main-
tained. Faced with these pressures for increased effectiveness under
budget constraints, inventory managers have turned to a logical and
promising combination of tools, the use of advanced management tech-
niques many of which can be programmed on modern large scale automatic
data processing equipment. While this combination appears to offer the
best hope for solution of the inventory manager's problem, it has
generated additional and unique problems of its own. These problems
are primarily of a (two-way) communication nature and can be summarized
as the problem of communication between the operations research analyst
(who is responsible for developing the mathematical policy) and the
inventory manager who must apply the policy in reaching his decision as
to how much and when to procure. There is a second critical problem
which may be assigned to the systems analyst; that of designing a data
input system which insures the validity of the mathematical computation
underlying the computer recommendation.
The problem of communication which was mentioned above has been
recognized although little has been done to date to solve the proolem.
Mr. Charles J. Hitch, Comptroller of the Defense Department, speaking to
the Operations Research Society of Canada states the problem:

Where mathematical models and computations are
useful they are in no sense alternative <? to or rivals of
good intuitive judgment, they supplement and complement
it. Judgment is always of critical importance in design-^
ing the analysis, choosing the alternatives to be compared,
and selecting the criterion. Except where there is a
completely satisfactory one-dimensional measurable objective
(a rare circumstance), judgment must supplement the quanti~
tative analysis before a choice can be recommended.
The Navy Ship's Parts Control Center at Mechanicsburg has been a
leading exponent of the application of mathematical models to problems
of inventory control. The problem of communication has also been
recognized at Mechanicsburg. A summary report given to Navy inventory
managers in June, I960, is quoted as follows:
... If there is to be success, two important
conditions must be met: communication and confidence .
These conditions are incumbent upon both the research
people and the operators.
The communications is particularly serious where
mathematics is involved. Research people cannot expect
everybody to learn their highly technical, language.
There is a communications gap that somebody has to fill
if anything is to come of the results of research. Un-
fortunately the bulk of reports are in a form which are
completely indigestible by operators. I have on my desk
a listing of some 3.500 projects in the field of logistics.
But in talking to various Armed Forces groups on the oper-
ating level I have yet to find any evidence^ of implementation.
Part of the fault lies with communications.
^
The problem of communication between the research and operating
levels must be recognized and solved if advanced management techniques
are to be fully effective. There are several management principles
1 Charles J. Hitch, "The New Approach to Management in the US Defense
Department. " Management Science. 9:1, October, 19^2.
^Application of Mathematical/statistical Rules at the Ship's
Control Center ; A report to Navy inventory managers given at NSD,
Mechanicsburg, June, I960, oy CAPT S. Sherwood, SC, USN.

which must be observed. The first and foremost is a recognition on
the part of top management that the mathematician, statistician, or
operations research analyst can contribute significantly to the
proolem of inventory management. Second, there must be a continuing
interchange of information between the operating and research levels,
as to such things as known facts of demand and item behavior. There
must be the same degree of information exchange between the analyst
responsible for design of the data input system so that mathematical
computations are reliable. Finally, there must be developed a communis
cation language which can translate mathematical formulae and principles
into a language which the operator or commodity manager can understand.
In the final analysis it is people who make decisions effective, and
without some knowledge and understanding of the mathematical principles,
the manager cannot intelligently change a computer recommended decision.
It is hoped that this study will help in the solution of these proolems.
Before discussing some of these basic problems in detail, it may
be helpful to review more general problems and background of scientific
management.
We live in an era of scientific management which began with the
work of Frederick W. Taylor and his associates in the latter part of
the nineteenth century. There are associations which have developed
from the work of scientists concerned with a variety of management
problems. The problems attacked in the development of a science of
management parallel those concerned with the problem of inventory
control or in the broad sense the problems of supply management.
The problems which have been attacked cover a vast area. Mathematical
techniques either exist or are being developed for the determination
of optimal policies for procurement (both how much and when to buy),
distribution (where to store initially), redistribution and echeloning
(what considerations govern the use or nonuse of either and just how
much redistribution should be done or if new procurement should be
used), and transportation, to name a few models. All of these techniques

or models have been developed using mathematical tools. The earliest
developments generally involve mathematics little more complex than
simple arithmetic. More recent developments involve mathematical
techniques so complex that only a sophisticated mathematician can
begin to understand their inner workings. It is not the intent of
this paper to explore these "higher mathematics." This will be left
to those who have had the necessary formal training. It is, however,
the purpose of this paper to explore some of the practical problems
which the techniques imply. The techniques undoubtedly can, if
properly administered, produce a more effective supply operation with
reductions in investment and operating funds. One of the biggest
problems faced by managers is the capability to understand and to
gain skill in using these advanced tools. Certainly one must become
skilled in their use, for any tool if poorly used can be less effective
than using no tools at all.
These skills that the supply manager must acquire differ with
the particular supply management scheme to be used. The manager may
have to learn how to use charts, nomographs, or even special compu=
tational techniques. With increasingly automated systems there is a
necessity for managers to recognize the conditions under which the
mechanized recommendation should be changed. Certainly managers will
have to learn new definitions and, most important, new ways of thinking
about supply. In developing safety level policy, he will learn for
example that 100 per cent supply effectiveness is theoretically in-
feasible to attain. He may learn that something very close to 100 per
cent can be attained but at an exceedingly high additional cost. Here
he must apply his knowledge of economics and weigh the cost of an
alternative decision. The manager must learn that a forecast is not
necessarily bad when actual usage does not equal the forecast. In
short, the manager is faced with a considerable amount of training if
he is to attempt to implement the advanced techniques.
A word of warning is in order concerning the many logistic studies

which have been completed under contract- It may be found that nc
all of the people who develop and propose to implement a scientific
management technique are competent practitioners. Many consultants
do not have the technical personnel who can produce and help to
implement the plan which is sought. It is not possible for those
who lack the specialized mathematical training to adequately evaluate
the competence of the consultant; therefore „ a partially trained
consultant's "contact man" can often "sell" the mathematically naieve
supply manager an ill-conceived scheme,, which is mathematically poor
and, therefore, cannot accomplish what it purports to do. It then
becomes essential to develop and depend on "in-hcuse" mathematical
capability for advice as to competence and eventual implementation.
The Navy's Ship's Parts Control Center is an outstanding example of
just such an organization. SPCC's Advanced Logistics Research Division,
supported by a group of mathematically oriented programming personnel,
have contributed greatly to the Navy Supply System by serving as a
"proving ground" for many advanced techniques. Although initially
largely contractor supported, a tremendous in-house capability has
been developed in a few short years.
The experience of SPCC and others who have successfully introduced
advanced inventory management techniques illustrates one of many
essential conditions. One of the most important conditions is the
management climate, from top level to the working level, which must
exist to insure successful implementation. Management must remove the
natural resistance to change which any going concern faces. Inventories
or the demands placed on the supply system do not behave much differently
than they did 20 or 30 years ago except perhaps in the quantity, communi-
cation media, and urgency of need. Many supply managers have demonstrated
the philosophy so often interpreted as "supply hasn't changed basically
and we managed supply very well before these high powered techniques,
so why change now?" The manager who lives by this philosophy will
almost certainly guarantee the demise of any new procedure which must

be adopted. A good manager is almost always characterized by a
flexibility and inquiring natuare which is really a "show me, what will
it do?" attitude. It is this type of management which inevitably moves
forward rapidly in adopting any technique which is shown to improve
performance or reduce costs. This type of management has led the way
in implementing advanced mathematical inventory control techniques.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
It is the purpose of this study: (1) to investigate several
areas of materiel management which are appropriate to the application
of advanced management techniques, i. e,, Selective Materiel Management,
Management Method Determinations, Economic Order Concepts, Variable
Safety Level Policy and Military Essentiality Coding, (2) to recommend
solutions to practical problems associated with implementation of these
policies.
IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
There are literally hundreds of logistic studies which have been
completed in the areas of advanced materiel management techniques.
Most of these studies emphasize the theoretical development of mathe-
matical formulae and have not been concerned with the practical problems
which inevitably arise during the implementation phase. The importance
of this study lies in the "highlighting" of these practical problems
and in the development of recommended solutions to the problems.
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
Decentralized Management. As related to item management the
decision of a centralized inventory manager to assign responsibility
for procurement and control to individual consumers or an intermediate
echelon or stock point. The central inventory manager reserves the
right to require periodic financial and or usage reports in order to
reevaluate his original management decision in the light of current
circumstances.

Distribution System . That complex of facilities, installations:
methods and procedures designed to receive,, store,, maintain, distribute,
and control the flow of military materiel between the point of receipt
into the military system and the point of issue to using activities
and organizations.
Inventory Control . Those management functions performed in the
control of material resulting in such integrated action as requirements
computation, procurement and production, distribution and redistribution,
repair and rebuild, and disposal of obsolete or excess material from the
supply system.
Inventory Control Point . An organization within the Department
of Defense whose primary mission is the world-wide inventory control
of assigned material. Inventory control functions are performed either
by individual military service (ICP's) or Defense Supply Agency Control
Points.
Inventory Fraction Codes . The application of management codes
by a central inventory manager to individual supply items for the pur-
pose of applying varying degrees of management emphasis. The codes are
normally representative of varying issue, sales rates, or special pro-
grams.
Operating Level of Supply . The quantity of material required to
be on hand to meet replenishable issue demands during the interval
between the arrival of successive replenishment shipments.
Safety Level of Supply . The quantity of material, in addition
to the operating level of supply, required to be on hand to permit con-
tinued operation in the event of minor interruption of normal replenish-
ment or variation in demand rates.
Procurement Cycle (PC) . The time interval between successive
procurements sometimes referred to as "Operating Level," The procure-
ment cycle and operating level (expressed in terms of time rather than
units) are synonomous only when one delivery is involved in a procurement.

Procurement Lea a Time £PLTlo The time in- between the
initiation of procurement action and the receipt into the supply system
of material purchased as a result of sucl a \ion» It omposed of
two principal elements „ administrative lead time and production lead
time.
(a) Administrative Lead. T^me (ALTjc The time interval
between initiation of procurement action and letting
of a contract or placing of an order*
(b) Production Lead Tjme o The time interval between the
placement of a contract and receipt into the supply
system of material acquired.
Reorder Point _(R0P) . That point at which time a stock replenish"
ment requisition would be submitted to maintain the predetermined or
calculated stcckage objective . The system reorder point is the sum of
safety level and procurement lead time.
Retail Stocks £as differentiated from Tjefense Sugply Ager-.r/
wholesale stocks) „ Material which is financed by individual military
department stock funds for issue to consuming units . Wholesale stocks
are initially financed with Defense Stock Funds and ultimately reimbursed
from military department stock funds.
Standard Unit Price, The per item issue price established and
published by an inventory manager in the Federal Catalog „ The main-
tenance of the price will be governed by such factors as volume cost





SELECTIVE MATERIEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
AS A MEANS OF EFFICIENTLY ALLOCATING: MANAGEMENT EFFORT
One of the advanced management techniques which employs both
a qualitative and quantitative approach is Selective Materiel Manage-
ment. Programs have been initiated at several Navy Inventory Control
Points (ICP's), within the Army, Air Force and the Defense Supply
Agency (DSA). Selective Management is not a new concept* Navy TCP's
have utilized fraction cedes as one method of segregating inventories
for selective management purposes . What is new is the recent attention
given to internal reorganization along commodity rather than function
lines, and assignment of selected items for more detailed and intensive
management attention. The use of mathematical and statistical concepts
in analyzing the inventory, as a basis for item selection, has been
extremely useful. The principles of Selective Management are simple in
that with human and financial resources limited, it is most economical
to allocate these resources to those items which have the potential 1
generating significant dollar savings. The program should also provide
for support of those weapon systems which have the highest priority, In
a broad sense management can be defined as the application of controls .
Selective Management Programs provide for applying these controls in the
most economical and efficient manner possible.
The Electronics Supply Office (ESO) and the Aviation Supply Office
(ASO), Navy ICP's for electronic and aviation material, have inaugerated
selective management programs. Items managed under these programs are
known as Special Treatment and Review Items (STAR). The objectives of
the STAR Program are quoted as follows;
(1) Apply maximum management attention to those items
having greatest annual dollar demand.
(2) Assure sound investment of procurement funds.
(3) Reduce inventory investment without detriment to
adequate stock availability.

(^) Provide for a flexible base to absorb periodic
funding deficiencies while maintaining overall
operational stability.
3
The ESO program has identified some 150=200 items within the
criteria of a minimum annual sales rate of $60,000. Included are
those items which are closely connected to an existing STAR item
requiring a similar management method. Although it is not evident
from the procedure it has been determined that the ESO STAR Program
involves management by a team consisting of approximately two civilian
and one officer manager for approximately 107 items.
Specific criteria are not available for the ASO STAR Program,
nor does there exist a standard procedure for all Navy IGP's.
The Air Force program for Selective Management emphasizes the
segregation of their inventory by unit prise into High s Medium and Lo
Value categories with varying management techniques
.
The Army has initiated a Selective Management Program based
primarily on future expected dollar sales, J This program is essentially
the same as STAR with more refined management controls established for
different levels of annual dollar demand.
The Defense Supply Agency has initiated a comprehensive study
and plan for implementing selective management procedures. The
3ES0 Internal Instruction W+0.57 Subject: Star Item Management
dated ^ January, 1963
.
^Record of telephone conversation between CAPT Tolson, DESG, and
LCDR Morrow of 3 May, 1963.
-^Army Regulation 710=45 Subject: Supply Control Policies and Pro-
cedures for Minor Secondary Items and Repair Parts, dated 15 October,
1962.
Defense Supply Agency Material Management System Requirements
Study dated July, 1963, pp. 13=3^.
10

objectives of the DSA Selective Materiel Management Program, in addition
to provision for increased effectiveness and economy, is to standardize
procedures which are to be implemented at each of its Supply Centers.'
The most important elements in the DSA Study are a stratification of
the inventories of each of the Centers into specified ranges of dollar
value of annual sales- Table I indicates the number of items each
Defense Supply Center is managing. The items are grouped in the ranges
of annual sales from $.01-$1,500, from $l,500~$lC,000 f and over $10,000.
An important point to note is the extremely large number of items in
the Lo= Value Range and their small contribution to total sales.
In the Lo°Value area ($„0I-=$1,500 VAD) it is noted that almost
90 per cent of the total items managed contribute only about 5 P&~
cent of total sales. This phenomena has been described as a "typical
inventory pattern" implying that management effort, hence human and
financial resources, should not be concentrated on the large number of
items that account for a very minor part of total dollar sales » In the
case of the DSC's, it is interesting to note that less than 3 per cent
of the total items managed contribute 86 per cent of total dollar sales
»
Sound economic reasoning alone would indicate that management attention
should be directed to this area where a major part of procurement dollars
are expended.
The DSA study also recognizes factors other than annual sales
which should be considered in selecting items for intensive management.
These items are designated VIP (Very Important Items) items and have the
following characteristics:
(1) Items with a history of a frequent out of stock
position.
(2) New items being introduced into the system which because
of high cost or importance must be reviewed at more
frequent intervals.
'Defense Supply Agency Regulation Number 4140.6 Subject: Selective
Material Management Program dated 4 September, 1962.
11

(3) Items with high unit cost and/or high annual
demand.
(4) Items highly essential to a particular mission or
weapon system.
In analyzing the DSA Study it is not only important to note the
role played by Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) but especially the
standardization of policy- A standard EOQ application has been
specified for items in the Lo-Value Range ($C~$1 C 400 annual sales).
This application results in economic procurement cycles ranging from
a minimum of 12 months to an upper limit constrained to 48 months
.
Normally these items will be procured under informal purchase pro-
cedures. For items having greater than $1,400 annual sales,, where
EOQ would dictate a procurement cycle of less than twelve months, the
method and frequency of procurement is to be determined by individual
analysis. For these items emphasis is on the method of procurement.
Selective review and analysis of each item will result in a selection
of one of several types of formal procurement methods available to the
contracting officer, i. e„, Indefinite Delivery or Quantity, Require-
ments, or Annual Buys.
There is one additional area which is particularly significant
to DSA and is in fact equally significant for any ICP. That is the
area of items which have no recorded usage. DSA has found that more
than 200,000 items, representing approximately 33-5 Per cent of the
total items managed, had no recorded issues." Many of these items are
either new in the system, are of an insurance nature, terminal (subject
to phase-out), or non-standard items. A vigorous program of individual
item review and analysis is necessary to identify and purge from the
system those items which do not warrant retention. The various programs
8DSA MMS Requirements Study, op., got .
, p 33.
9 IbJ1d, p 31"
12

being carried on to develop military e: :iality coding will be of
great value in assisting in this determination.
The above discussion of selective management programs has outlined
criteria which are useful to the managers in selecting items for varying
degrees of attention. The rules v however useful for this purpose, must
be supplemented by additional study of how best to reorganize the
commodity management group to make the best use of available human
resources. In developing these criteria it will be recognized that the
problem is primarily one of qualitative rather than quantitative analysis,
While prudent management would dictate assignment of the Hi-Value most
critical and difficult items to manage to the most competent item
manager, what is needed is a more definitive decision rule on which
this assignment can be made. This is the practical problem faced by
management. It is a fact of life that this is a formidable task, for
in reality, many of the techniques of selective management are still in
the formative stage. The techniques cannot be fully evaluated in terms
of workload impact until applied.
In applying management effort to the Lc-Value area of the inven-
tory, the sheer weight of numbers of items alone suggest that human
effort be minimized and mechanized effort be substituted. This tech-
nique implies as its ultimate goal completely automated review and
replenishment of stocks on the basis of economic order quantities and
variable stock levels. Obviously this goal will require a great deal
of system design and effort to insure that the mechanically prepared
procurement document can be accepted by management. Until such time as
this automated system is reliable , it will be necessary to devote human
resources and manual effort to insure effective control. The ASO has
developed and is now testing an Automated Procurement System for its
Lo^Value items as a part of its Management Improvement Frogram.
The nature of the selective management approach requires that a
greater part of the total management effort will be devoted to that
portion of the inventory representing the greatest dollar sales and
13

to those items requiring special treatment. Realizing that this,
approach requires intensive managements, what are some specific actions
which should be taken by commodity managers? First, and most important
is the establishment of a real team effort to develop more economical
methods of management. This effort will require the closest coordi-
nation of all elements of the inventory manager organization. Not
only should a "one best" method of procurement be developed, but inten-
sive efforts in the technical area should result in standardization
and simplification studies which will trim the inventory to a minimum
number of required items. It may be pointed cut that these are the
normal functions of existing IGP's, however, Selective Management
requires a much more intensive effort among all the working divisions.
As an example , commodity managers must sit down with their counterparts
in procurement and assess the economies which can result from the
various types of procurement. This investigation should devulge ways
to reduce operating and investment costs which are greater than simply
buying under the EOQ principle.
Finally,, the basic concept of selective management is that a
greater degree of management should be applied to those items which have
the greatest potential for generating savings. Eliminating a month of
pipeline stock for the item which is selling at the rate of $100,000 a
year is worth 100 times more than an item which is selling at the rate
of $1,000 per year. Selective Management using annual sales as the
common denominator for the normal consumption type item is a valid and
justifiable method for item and personnel assignments. The development
of military essentiality codes is a further refinement.
Table II outlines one method for determining the number of items
to be assigned to each commodity manager. This Table was developed on
the basis of the review (Procurement) cycle which is generated by the
application of the EOQ formula. Specifically, it represents a break
=
out (refer to Table I) of the items managed at the Defense General Supply
U

Center- In utilizing Table II as a general guide it should be noiied
that any method of item assigrment rhioh is based on the value of
annual sales must be modified to recognize other equally important
factors. These factors which may be unrelated to annual dollar sales
are such practical considerations as military essentiality, mobilization,
frequency of out of stock, and related factors. Until such time as
valid military essentiality coding is developed , breakout of items
using dollar value of annual sales is one recommended method of item
selection.
In the final analysis staff assistants can recommend a general
basis for initial assignment of items under a Selective Material Manage-
ment Program based on annual dollar sales . However „ it should be
recognized that this criteria is to be used only as an initial starting
point. The test of how well any such program performs is through
evaluation of performance results. Management must assign items under
criteria which are of necessity largely arbitrary and then measure
results. The test of the initial assignment will eventually be reflected
in performance,, effectiveness , and cost reduction statistics. Review
and evaluation of these reports will serve to guide changes in the
initial item assignment as the program develops.
As has been pointed out above , dollar value of annual sales should
not be considered the sole criterion in determining item assignment and
personnel requirements. However, the stratification of items by dollar
value of annual sales provides a starting point in the selective manage-
ment program.* Until such time as further refinements can be accomplished,
such as military essentiality codings, it would seem logical and desirable
to have some degree of standardization. As far as can now be determined,
each Navy ICP appears to be developing and implementing its own criteria
Recognizing that there are differences in the types of material
being managed by Navy ICP's, these differences should have no bearing
on dollar value of annual demand stratification.
15

which is not necessarily compatible with other ICP ! Sc Since BuSandA is
charged with the responsibility for central policy coordination and
direction cf ICP's t a standardized approach to Selective Management
would enable BuSandA to better control and evaluate ICP performance.
It is, therefore^ recommended that BuSandA initiate a standard pro=
gram for selective materiel management to be implemented at all ICF s
Ihe program which is now under development for uniform ICP decision





THE PROBLEM 0£ DECIDING
HOW MUCH M£ HOW OFTE£ TO PROCURE
The problem of how much and when to procure has been the subject
of numerous studies. A review of the scientific inventory control
literature confirms one revealing fact, that there is really nothing
new under the sun but rather an increasing knowledge and understanding
of those tools already in existence. This is the case with the basic
economic order quantity formula which was developed approximately forty
years ago. Professor Ihomson M. Whit in of Princeton University indi-
cates that several authors are credited with development of an economic
10
purchase quantity formula during the years 1925k 192o, and 1927-
This formula which equates the cost of ordering stock to the cost of
holding stock is usually referred to as the standard square root
formula. It has also been characterized as the Wilson EOQ formula, as
a result of its adaptation by R. H. Wilson to the problem of handling
quantity discounts. A review of additional sources which discuss the
techniques of advanced inventory management systems reveal only a
1?difference in notation symbols in discussing the basic EOQ formula.
The implementation of economic order and procurement policies
was directed for all the military services for consumption type items
which are stocked on the basis of repetitive demand by DOD INSTRUCTION
4-1^.11. It is interesting to note that the formula outlined for
adoption is the standard EOQ formula;
10 Thomson M. Whitin, The Theory of Inventory Mana£emgnt (Princeton:
Princeton University Press , 1957)* pp 31-32.
11
IbJ!dJ p. 36.
Martin K. Starr and David W. Miller, Inventory Control : Theory
and Practice (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Tnc.l9o2)„ pp. 79-81.
17

¥fQ ~ 1/2 4Q where
Q is the economic order quantity in dollars
A is the annual demand in dol]
C is the cost to order in dollars
H is the cost to hold expressed as a
percentage per year.^3
Excepted from the application of the EOQ policy are those items subject
to excessive deterioration, to seasonal or economical production, unit
pack items, subject to storage availability, or lack of adequate pro=
curement funds. The DOD instruction outlines specific elements of
order and holding cost which are to be considered by inventory managers
in developing cost to order and cost to hold parameter values
.
How have the military services implemented this DOD policy? All
of the military services have implemented an EOQ policy at seme level
of supply; however, there are a variety of plans for specific applica-
tions. The Navy implementation has teen carried out primarily at the
ICP's using various models. The Planning Research Corporation developed
a set of mechanical stock control tables based on a study at the Naval
Supply Center, San Diego. These tables were later used to convert the
GA fraction (locally procured and managed general supply items) at all
Navy Stock Points in i960. The Advanced Logistics Research Division of
BuSandA has monitored a number of in°house and contractor studies for
development of mere advanced models.
In contrast to the Navy implementation of EOQ policies at the
system management level, the Array initially concentrated at the user
level and subsequently converted the major consumers in 1961=62. A




which was to serve as a model for other Army ICP's.
The Air Force has applied a modified EOQ policy termed its
Economic Order and Stockage Policy at the IGP and Depot level along
13D0D INSTRUCTION 41^0.11, Subject: Peacetime Operating and Safety
Levels of Supply; dated 2k June, 1958.
18

with a Selective Management Program based on Hi, Medium,, and Lo -Value
sales ranges. It is to be noted that the application of EOQ within
the various services has developed a variety of cost to order and cost
to hold values in implementing these principles., This is, of irse,
a result of developing cost studies under very broad guidance from
DO D, and to an extent, perhaps a recognition, that costs do vary with
management of differing commodities. The problem of determining c
-
to order and cost to hold will be considered In more detail, since it
is obvious that these costs really determine the basic questions of
how much and how often. The development of precise cost to order and
cost to hold values appear to be one of the major factors delaying the
full implementation of EOQ by the services. Existing accounting
systems have not provided precise cost data in order to develop the
variable (incremental) order and holding costs. The Harbridge House
Study for the Army and the Dunlap Associates Study for T v. e Navy are
examples of costly efforts to develop precise cost data. ^ The
nature of the problem of measuring costs and their importance in ref-
lation to decision making has been discussed as follows
:
There is no general approach to the problem such
that when we apply it we can be assured that we will be
achieving correct measurment of costs. On the contrary,
in practice we are forced to utilize whatever ad hoc
methods can be discovered which seem applicable . . .
Generally, it is possible to measure all the costs in-
volved in the usual kind of inventory situation with
sufficient accuracy to achieve a resolution of the
inventory decision problem. We say sufficient, accuracy
because . . . the optimal course of action is not likely
to be very much changed by even relatively large errors
in the measurement of costs. In other words, the typical
inventory analysis is not overly sensitive to reasonable
errors in the measurement of costs. This fact helps to
reassure us that our conclusions will be essentially





-^Harbridge House , Inc. E3P Report Nr. 2 National Order and
Holding Costs of the U. S. Army Signal Supply Agency, Philadelp]
dated 7 March, 196l.




The basic nature and relationship of the variable costs to
order and hold as formulated in the SOQ formula provide a significant
degree of tolerance in estimating these costs. Figure 1 illustrates
the graphical relationship between order p holding, and total costs.
It can be seen that a relatively large change in order cost will r.
appreciably affect total costs. Table III illustrates that an order
to holding cost ratio, which varies as much as 50 per cent from an
assumed true ratio , results in a minimum increase in expected total
operating costs . It is seen that an error in the ratio of order
holding cost of from 50 per cent under to 200 per cent over assumed
true., will only increase expected operating costs by about 6 per cent,.
This fact is explained by the relationship between the variable costs
and the effect of the square root formula,, which tends to greatly
reduce the magnitude of error. Welch calls the square root sign a
sort of "forgiveness factor"
'
How should all of this theory affect the implementation of
economic order policy from management's viewpoint? First, and most
important, management should not delay installation of economic order
quantity policy pending the development of elaborate and time consum-
ing cost studies. The fact that considerable errors in estimation can
be tolerated in the basic formula, plus the realization that forecasts
of average demand are subject to considerable error, suggests that
management should install the concept without delay , There is no
question that the total operating costs associated with managing an
inventory will be reduced to a practical, minimum by using the economic
order principle. Many studies have been made to show the savings in
both investment and operating costs which can result from substituting
a variable EOQ procurement cycle for the traditional fixed replenish-
ment cycle. The basic question which management fac»'-s is to what
extent the system should be standardized at various echelons of supply
and among commodity groupings. The question which may be asked is
1.6w. Evert Welch, Tested Scientific Inventory Control . (Greenwich:
Management Publishing Corporation, 195^) « P* £'7-
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whether the costs of order and holding should be standardized or
rather the system for collecting these costs. This was one of the
problems faced by the DSA in consolidating and standardizing policies
at the former single manager operating agencies. Information available
from DSA Headquarters (Table IV) indicates the application of EOQ at
fGur centers o The nK M value, which represents the ratio of order to
holding costs, is seen to vary from 28,52 to 59 9 Illustrated are
the economic procurement cycles, expressed in months of stock, which
result from applying the varying K factors to an item selling at the
annual rate of $900 1 As indicated, the economic procurement cycles
vary from 11,4 to 24.0 months of stock for this item although its
annual sales rate is the same at each Center . This variance results
in each Center's submission of annual budget requests which are based
on computed requirements for operating stocks using different ECQ
factors <. DSA Headquarters would undoubtedly find that it is extremely
difficult to compare and evaluate these budget requirements because
each request represents a different level of operating stock. In
recognition of the fact that determination of the ratio of cost to
order to cost to hold is at best a rough estimate , and as previously
shown is not required to be a precise value, DSA Headquarters has
standardized these costs for items subject to informal purchase pro-
cedures. This standardization is effected at all the Defense Supply
Centers in the DSA Selective Materiel Management Program as set forth
in DSA Regulation 4140.6, The actual implementation requires the use
of a K factor of 37° 4 applicable to all items having $1,400 or less
annual sales. This policy is specified for Lc-Value items under
the Selective Materiel Management Program and would result in a
standard procurement cycle of 15 months for the illustrated item.
(Table IV)
^Defense Supply Agency Letter DSAH=0M: Subject: Selective
Materiel Management Program dated 18 December, 1962.
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The problem of variation in implementing economic inventory-
policy within the military services has been the subject of a DOIKwide
study under Project 65. Among the objectives of this study was the
review, evaluation, and development of uniform cost elements in order
to provide a common factor basis for developing economic operating
levels and re-order points. This study noted in its early stages
the lack of uniformity and any attempt to standardize policies in
the iUvy
,
There is considerable variation among Navy ICP's
in their approaches to Economic Inventory Programs. There
is no current Navy program to review and validate or adjust
differences o^-°
Based on these findings it is apparent that the Navy has not yet
fully implemented economic ordering and procurement policy as outlined
in DOD Instruction ^140.11. It can be assumed that considerable
research and effort has been made to develop more advanced approaches.
There would appear to be much cause for concern, not only because of
the amount of time it has taken to install what has been known for
many years, but also the problem referred to earlier concerning the
need for precise measurement of the variables involved.
From an operator's viewpoint, it is essential that he be provided
with tools which now are or could be readily made available to assist
him in the solution of his inventory management problems . There will
always be a need for logistics research to refine and improve existing
advanced techniques, but there is a pressing need for putting these
ques to work when it is known they are an improvement over
historical "rule of thumb" decision rules or, at any rate, are "better"
than the methods presently employed. The action taken by DSA to
standardize the EOQ factor for one segment of inventory at all its
^Memorandum for the Record: Subject". Project 65-Economie
Inventory Programs dated 29 December, 1961, signed Walter Goldfinger,
Project 65 Action Officer.
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Supply Centers, net only provides DSA with a means of comparing budget
and performance, but more important, provides the operator with a
recognized minimum cost tool.
The current BuSandA programs for standardizing automated systems
at its major ICP's and related stock 'points provides an opportunity
to implement a uniform approach to EOQ. If this effort is unduly
delayed by procurement and installation of equipment, 3uSandA should
act to implement uniform procedures for application in existing
systems- It is to be recognized that cost differences do exist
between ICP's and within ICP's between differing types of material.
Primary stock points undoubtedly experience cost differences of a
lower order of magnitude. However, these differences should not
significantly affect development of uniform costs; therefore, it is
recommended that BuSandA develop and implement standardized cost




THE PROBLEM OF DECIDING THE MOST
EFFICIENT METHOD 0£ MANAGEMENT
( CENTRALIZED VS DECENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT)
The problem of the level of management at which items entering
the system should be managed is one which has constantly plagued
inventory managers. It is only recently that the tools of operations
research have been brought to bear on this problem. In essence this
problem is similar to others faced by the operating manager. He is
provided with a great deal of general guidance, but lacks a definitive
rule for decision purposes. DOD Instruction klkO .7 of February, 196l,
outlines criteria which are to be applied by inventory managers in
determining whether items of supply will be centrally managed and
20
stocked or decentralized to local activity acquisition. The
instruction outlines several factors which must be considered in
making a management method determination. These factors require a
review of the item in relation to combat essentiality, military speci-
fication requirements, requirements for maintaining mobilization
stockage, deterioration and obsolescence, demand rates, availability
in commercial distribution channels, and finally the method of manage-
ment which is most economical to the government. The factors other
than economy can generally be tested on the basis of technical, catalog,
and descriptive data which accompanies the request for item establish-
ments It is true that probably not all such data will be immediately
available and will require a good deal of concentrated effort to ootain.
Two typical examples are the determination of an appropriate shelf life
which may require a series of laboratory tests; the determination of
commercial availability which may require joint investigation and
20 DOD INSTRUCTION 1*140,7, Subject: Supply . Control . and




research by the commodity manager and procurement specialist.
When all other factors governing management method have been
tested the factor of economy will greatly influence a decision as
to whether the item should be controlled under centralized or decentra-
lized management. Economy of central versus decentralized management
involves a comparison of the relevant costs of each management method.
The question which must be answered is how much does it cost the
central inventory manager to procure and hold system stocks as compared
to the costs which might be expected if each requiring activity were
to procure its own requirements. At the outset it must be recognized
that the determination of costs, whether at the national or local level
may involve a considerable error of estimation. This fact is explained
by the nature of military accounting systems which are not at present
compatible with the type of cost break-out required for stockage and
procurement cost comparisons. Estimated costs can be useful when
applied in advanced decision rules which in many cases are not critical
in the actual computation. Certainly, a computation which uses estimated
costs is superior to unaided, and in many cases arbitrary intuitive
human judgment.
How has the Navy specifically met the problem of developing a
decision rule for its ICP's to determine economy of centralized versus
decentralized management? The policy of the Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts is quoted as follows:
It is the policy of this Bureau that secondary items
in the Navy Supply System which are readily available from
local commercial or government sources will be procured and
managed locally unless management is necessary for reasons
of military readiness or the items can be more economically
procured through central control . The term, being readily
available from local commercial sources, means that the
items are derived from routine production by a manufacturer
who customarily distributes his product nationally through
dispersed local outlets, or that the items are produced




of the military activities in the local area. L
From a practical viewpoint how does the individual ICP manager
translate this broad guidance as to economy of central procurement
into a workable decision rule? Here again, as in the case of Selective
Management, each ICP has established its own criteria for decision
making. Historically, these determinations have been made on the
basis of some generally arbitrary dollar value of annual sales cut-off.
What tool can be developed to assist the manager in improving
his management method decision? One method is an extension of the
recognized and accepted principles of economic ordering. This concept
provides an acceptable estimation of the costs of central procurement
and holding and only requires an estimate of local costs for purposes
of comparison and decision. Table V illustrates a mathematical formula
for comparing the costs of centralized and decentralized management.
First, what are the costs of central management? They are the
administrative costs of purchasing and holding operating and safety
stocks. Also included is the cost of the material itself, and trans-
portation costs for first and second destination charges (included in
the Standard Unit Price). What are the costs of decentralized manage-
ment? These costs are the basic costs of the material and those costs
associated with buying and holding the stock. Transportation costs are
included in the local purchase price of the item. Two basic assump-
tions underlie construction of the formulae. Studies made at the
DGSC indicated that two sets of cost factors were approximately equal
so each was dropped from the formulae. These costs were the admini-
strative costs of initiating and processing requisitions through the
Depot system (a central management cost) and the cost to initiate a
21Chief Bureau of Supplies and Accounts letter Sl^.5. Subject:




purchase action locally (a decentralized management cost). No attempt
has been made to compute a holding cost locally, since holding costs
would be equal at the local level regardless of the source of supply,
i.e., from local purchases or by requisitioning on the ICP. The formula
for total expected central management costs represents order, material
and holding costs for maintenance of system stocks. It is to be noted
that transportation costs for centralized procurement have been in-
cluded in the standard unit price by a predetermined percentage mark-up
for first and second destination charges.
Decentralized costs are thus represented by a simple formula
which is the product of estimated annual demand in units of stock
multiplied by an average local purchase price.
An illustrative example of applying the formula is presented in
Table VI. The formula compares the centralized and decentralized
management costs of an item which has an average annual system demand
of 9,600 units, is procured centrally at a standard unit price of $0.25
per item and locally at an average cost of $0.40. Using an ICP order
cost of $108.30 and a 15 per cent holding cost, total central costs
equal $2,709.40. The decentralized costs total $3,840.00 indicating
central management is more economical. The central management costs
have also been expressed as a percentage of annual sales. Similarly,
standard unit price and local purchase price are expressed as a percent
of annual sales. This expression permits the construction of a nomograph
of Centralized-Decentralized Management (Figure 2), providing a decision
rule for purposes of manual comparisons by commodity managers. As
pointed out in Chapter I, a major problem in the implementation of
advanced decision rules is the necessity for communicating these rules
to the individual commodity manager responsible for the final decision.
Figure 2 illustrates the graphical representation of the formula for
centralized and decentralized management costs. The insert illustrates
how the manager can apply the same demand and price data used in the
example in Table VI to reach a decision. The nomograph permits a manager
to apply a mathematical decision rule without requiring him to fully
understand the principles on which the formula is based. Given the
27

required input data for demand and price, he can make a decision
consistent with the established policy
.
The management method formulae obviously lends itself to computer
application since the elements required for computation of economic
procurement cycles will undoubtedly be programmed as a part of the
materiel management system. The nomograph can supplement a mechanized
system particularly if price or demand input data has significantly
changed subsequent to the cut-off for the machine program, thus provid-
ing a tool to aid in more consistent management decisions
.
The mathematical decision rule for determining the most economical
method of management is an extremely useful tool for any inventory
manager who must make this determination . As any advanced decision rule,
the decision which results from its application is only as valid as the
input data used in the computation. As mentioned before, some costs must
at present be estimated since accounting systems are not geared to
generate actual costs. The problem of estimating parameter costs should
not defer implementation of mathematical decision rules as long as these
estimations are recognized by the manager. In many cases the very nature
of the interaction of costs will offset errors in estimation and will
provide a basis for more rational and logical decisions.
It is recommended that the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts consider
the procedure outlined above as a basis for development of a standard
approach to the problem of management method determination. The
principles are sound and will permit any variations in costs which may
be found between ICP's. This procedure could be easily incorporated in
the current BuSandA program for standardizing materiel management systems




THE PBOMM QF_ A-CHIEyiMG A DESXREj) LEffl,
QZ 3X£XM EJJEJCTSMSS
PART 1 V- i^Jl Safety. Level PyH^las
DOD directed the development and implementation of variable safety
levels in 1958s
Co Th* objective of this instruction is to provide for
mere effective and economical operating and safety
levels of supply for these types of items (miner
.secondary-consumable) by utilizing i
lo Economic order and procurement principles
for the establishment and maintenance of
optimum operating levels <>
2° Probability principles for the establish-
ment of safety levels which will provide




The DOD directive sets forth specific factors to be considered in
calculation of safety levels for central inventory control points 1
(a) Frequency of demands, (both mean and variable).
(b) Size of demands.
(c) Reliability of resupply.
(d) Mission of the supported units of activities.
(e) Military, essentiality and criticality of the item.
Finally, DOD establishes a reorder point system for consumable type items
(in lieu of fixed replenishment cycles) and charges the military services
with the development of specific formulae for computing safety levels and
values for the variables outlined above.
The military services have developed a variety of formulae and
systems for introducing variable safety levels. Under the broad DOD
guidance there obviously is a lack of uniformity in the systems. However,
upon closer scrutiny,, there are common features shared by each.
22D0D INSTRUCTION 41.40.11 of 24 June, 1958, QEo s*L»
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It is not possible tc examine each model in detail in this survey,
but to develop points of similarity and examine a few of the general
assump* Ions upon which the models are constructed. It will become
apparent to anyone who launches a study of scientific inventory manage-
ment systems that the introduction of variable safety levels involves
decisions under risk and uncertainty. The risk involves primarily the
costs and loss of supply performance which result from an out of stock
position. The uncertainty involves the future unknown demand and our
ability or inability to predict or forecast this demand. It becomes
immediately obvious that the forecast of demand and the accuracy or
error in the forecast will largely determine the need for safety stocks.
It is interesting to note that one individual has launched a whole
23
career around this single element of the requirements problem.
Robert G„ Brown's development of statistical forecasting systems are
generally basic to any of the sophisticated safety level models. The
systems he proposes have progressed from a relatively simple single
smoothing model to a current triple smoothing model.
The traditional "saw tooth" chart (Figure 3) graphically illustrates
the elements of a supply control review and dramatizes the role safety
stocks play in determining supply performance. These elements have been
described as elements of the procurement or requirements objective period.
The particular item illustrated indicates a total requirement or procure-
ment objective period of 15 months comprised of a 6 month operating level
(assumed to be computed under economic procurement principles as described
in Chapter III), a procurement lead time of 8 months (comprised of 3
months ALT, k months production and 1 month delivery time) and a fixed
safety level, of one month. The fixed safety level represents the
traditional fixed days or months of stock which have been used prior to
^Robert G. Brown, Statistical. Forecasting for. Xnyentorx Control,
(New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959)
2
^Robert G. Brown, Smoothing . Forecasting. aM Prediction.
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963)
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the concept of variable safety level policies. The reorder point is
illustrated as that level of stock represented by average usage totaling
9 months, the sum of the procurement lead time and safety level. When
the net inventory (stock on hand and en order less back orders) falls
to this reorder level, a procurement of an Economic Order Quantity (EOQ)
is initiated to replenish the system stock. It is apparent that supply
performance or effectiveness is largely determined by events taking
place during the period of time between the initiation of an order and
the receipt into stock of that order. The critical time of exposure
to stock-out occurs just prior to receipt of any given replenishment
order. If deliveries from contract are delayed,, if the reorder is not
initiated in a timely manner, or if demand exceeds the forecast, there
is a finite probability that the item will fall through the safety level
to an out of stock position. The amount of safety stock (size of safety
level) will determine the ability to continue to meet customer demand.
The lack of stock will result in back orders and a drop in supply per-
formance. The advantages of a variable safety level in combination with
a more accurate forecast are readily apparent. Any policy which can
"tailor" each item's safety stock to the expected variation in demand
will improve over-all supply performance. Even more important in today's
climate of limited funds, the policy will insure maximum performance per
dollar of investment in safety stock. The variable safety level policy
in conjunction with military essentiality codes, enables the inventory
manager to provide a predetermined percentage of availability on an
item by item basis.
All variable safety level models employ the principles of statistics
and probability in computing predetermined levels of effectiveness. The
problem in supply management parallels that of the insurance company.
Like the insurance company, it is necessary to predetermine rates (levels
of supply) to insure a profit (provide specified supply support) over a
future time period. Statistics provide a means of measuring probable
or expected variation in future demands and the laws of probability
31

provide a means of mathematically computing levels of stock which will
provide a required percent of protection and performance . Here again the
mathematical approach is not intended as a substitute for judgment.
It provides a systematic method for calculating the
effects of several variables; it is intended as an aid to
judgments not as a substitute . . . Mathematics leads to
more precise ways of determining inventory levels than are
possible on the basis of intuition. As soon as several
variables are present in a problem, most human minds cannot
readily estimate the results of their interaction; the
mathematical approach is helpful in this respect, ?
Whitin recognizes the fallacies of across the board fixed safety
allowances
:
The same allowance is made for items of extreme
importance as is made for items of negligible importance.
It would seem sensible to have larger safety allowances
for the more important categories of items and to reduce
these allowances for categories of items of small
importance. 2&
In reviewing the various mathematical models which have been
developed in recent years, it is apparent that aside from notational
differences there is general agreement concerning basic approaches to
the V3L problem. For example, an analysis of the models in use at the
Ship's Parts Control Center, Defense Medical Supply Center, and the IBM
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model are quite similar. ' All employ the method of forecasting,
termed Exponential Smoothing, developed by Brown. ~' It is not the pur-
pose of this paper to examine the method or details of Exponential
2




' General Information Manual IMPACT, Inventory Management Program
and Control Techniques. 1962, (International Business Machines Corporation)




Smoothing or other forecasting techniques. It is sufficient to note
that the Exponential Smoothing Technique attempts to improve the fore-
cast of demand over lead time by weighting most recent demand more
heavily than historical demand- The use of special computational pro-
cedures permit the recognition and adjustment for trends in demand which
may exists In general, all the models reviewed measure the error in
forecast of demand against actual demand, and employ a statistical
distribution as a means of specifying a level of safety stock which will
insure a desired percent of supply effectiveness.
There are several differences among the models as applied which
are worthy of note. For example, the SPCC model which appears to be
extremely sophisticated, employs not one but three different statistical
distributions, i.e., the Poisson, Negative Binomial, and Normal. These
distributions are selectively applied on the basis of established ranges
of unit demand size. The degree of sophistication provided by three
different probability distributions to represent demand is questionable.
The studies of R. G. Brown have shown that the distribution of forecast
errors follows the Normal distribution rather closely for those items
which have experienced relatively frequent demand. It is recognized
that in military supply systems many items of an insurance nature are
characterized by extremely low mean demand rates and high variation in
demand. For these items a statistical distribution other than the normal
would be more appropriate.
It is also interesting to note that the SPCC model incorporates
a shortage or stock-out cost which is currently established at $50.00
plus the square root of the unit prise. This feature of the model was
developed prior to the establishment of Military Essentiality Codes. As
pointed out in the ALRAND extract, there is some cost involved in being
out of stock. The problem of assigning any realistic value to the cost




of being out of stock is difficult, if not impossible, from a military-
point of view, in the words of R, G. Brown in discussing this problem:
"The stock-out cost is not known by anyone, but adjusted to give desirable
results. "3° All variable safety level policies imply some stock-out cost
when supplies are not available for issue when and where requiredo When
stock-out cost is used as a parameter in the VSL formulae, the value
assigned is usually manipulated to produce the stock availability desired.
Therefore,, a more practical approach is to establish the availability
desired (expressed in terms of a risk factor) and then permit the stock-
out cost to be an implicit value determined by this specified level of
availability , A further refinement (and one which SPGC has suggested by
use of the control knob"\2) is the establishment of the level of avail-
ability based on a military essentiality code., This will insure the
highest degree of protection against stock-out for the most essential
items o SPGC has developed an elaborate three digit MEC Code which
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apparently will serve as the basis for this approach. The 3PCC model
also develops a computed variance in the Production Lead Time which is
an attempt to recognize and adjust for an additional variable. This
computation will normally be useful only for those items which are pro-
cured frequently enough to establish reliable production and delivery
patterns.
The Variable Safety Level model employed by the Defense Medical
Supply Center is similar to that used by SPCC with some minor differences.
The DMSC model, for example, employs double exponential smoothing with
trend correction. The level of availability is set at a 95 per cent
confidence level for all items without regard to military essentiality
32
or stock-out cost. It is important to note that the DMSC model
3°Arthur D. Little Inc. , Work Memorandum Number 63, dated 10
April, 1962.
31SPCC Internal Instruction WO.285A, Subject: Non-Stocked Items
(N3I) : yeyjew , evaluation and processing of , dated 30 October, 196l
.
32DSA MMS REMITS STUDY Op_. cit. pp. 39, 65.
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calculated a variable level for each depot rather than a system-wide
calculation. This approach, plus insuring a 95 per* cent confidence level
at each depot for each item, resulted in a higher investment, i.e., an
average of four months or more. The establishment of a system computation
will reduce the total VSL investment ; however, the development of military
essentiality coding is a more logical basis for- adjusting the desired
level of availability by item*
The IBM Company has developed a statistical forecasting and
Variable Safety Level model which uses safety factors from the normal
33distribution to set a desired level of availability* R. G, Brown's
method of forecasting using exponential smoothing is included . The
method suggested by IH1 is the same as that used by the EMSC. Perhaps
the really unique feature of the 131 model is the fact that many of the
required programs are developed and available to the IBM equipment user.
Although developed for the commercial trade, the programs should be
easily adapted for use in a military inventory problem. These "canned"
programs are capable of significantly reducing a normal leadtime of
testing and simulation which are required in implementing advanced manage-
ment systems.
PART 2 TJig. Uge of Military Essentiality Codes
Military essentiality coding is a method by which management can
select those items which have a vital relationship to a particular
weapon system or component of a weapon system and insure a specified
level of performance of the weapon system by having the item on hand
when required. The Navy has been a leader in the study of weapon systems
with their related components in the development of usable and realistic
essentiality codes t The extensive study conducted under contract to
George Washington University has provided military essentiality codes
for submarine repair parts. The SPCC„ as previously discussed, has
33General Information Manual IMPACT Og,. fijt .
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developed an elaborate three (3) digit code, which can be used in
provisioning as well as stockage level decisions. The uniform automated
system presently being developed for the major Navy ICP's will incorporate
essentiality coding as a means of controlling the application of advanced
34
supply and provisioning decision rules, Cdr, Mills, Director of
BuSandA "s Advanced Logistics Research Division, suggests a method of
defining states of material readiness by an analysis of mission per-
35formance.-^ This method of analysis would provide a means of assigning
military essentiality codes to particular items of supply in relation
to their contribution to mission performance. Cdr. Mills points out
the necessity for the operator's evaluation in development of essentiality
codes:
. . » If judgment is to be exercised then it seems best
to use the judgment of the people who have the most
knowledge at the level in the hierarchy being considered
.
Thus, perhaps, the Commanding Officer is best qualified
to make judgments at the system level; department heads at
the subsystem level; JO's at the sub-sub system level;
chiefs at the component level: rated men at the part level 36
H. W, Karr of the General Electric Company proposed a method of
determining military essentiality of aircraft repair parts to be used
37in stocking flyaway kits for aircraft squadron deployments. This
article is an interesting example of how probability principles, space,
weight, and budget constraints, and the operator's judgment, can be
interrelated to provide a military essentiality code. The method pro-
posed by Karr is a type of analysis which can be useful in developing a
^Capt. S. M. Ball, SC, USN, "Automation in the Navy Supply System,"
BuSandA Newsletter,, XXVI (April, 1963), p. 27.
35Cdr. H. F. Mills, SC, USN, "Military Essentiality," BuSandA
Newsletter,, XXVI (March, 1963), pp. 4-7.
36
_lbid.
3?H, W. Karr, A Method £ox Estimating
Rand paper, p. 1064? 17 April, 1957.
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code of relative essentiality as a basis for- adjusting the application
of the variable safety level in accordance with probable effect on
mission assignment. An example of the use of military essentiality
codes developed along the lines suggested by Karr is SPCC's support
policy for SSB(N) related items. SPCC has specified a 95 per cent level
cf availability for all SSB(N) support items at NSC, Charleston, bearing
the highest military essentiality coding.-' This is a practical example
of insured item support using the military essentiality code in combination
with the variable safety level.
It should be emphasized that the development of essentiality codes
for those items of a general support nature in relation to mission or
weapon systems is a much more difficult task. For example, how can items
such as common hand tools be related to a particular mission or weapon
system? Although common in nature, these items, if not available when
required, can have a serious effect on accomplishing a mission. The old
adage "for the lack of a nail" typifies this problem. This is not to say
that an effort should not be made to specify some degree of relative
essentiality regardless of the commodity in question. Information
available from the DGSC is an interesting example of one method of handl-
ing this problem. Research at DGSC disclosed that approximately 8,000
general supply items could be identified in some way with combat support.
This research was accomplished by screening such publications as Navy
Load and Allowance Lists and Army Theater Commander lists of combat
essential items. Based on these lists, a tentative essentiality code
was assigned ranging from a category 1 for highest degree of essentiality
to a category ^ for lowest essentiality. Listings were then coordinated
with the military service retail managers for their concurrence. As a
result of this effort, some 19,000 items were eventually assigned
essentiality codes. The codes provide a means for specifying varying
levels of desired effectiveness in relation to the Variable Safety Level
38FADM(SEL) Ira F. Haddock, SC, USN, "Supporting Polaris Complex
Costly," BuSandA Newsletter. XXVI, 8 August 1963, p. 21.
37

Policy o A simulation test was completed in April , 1963
s.
for comparing
the dollar value of investment of fixed versus variable safety levels.
The VSL M' i ?.s programmed so as to compute varying levels of
effectiveness in relation to varying essentiality codes., Using a mini=
mum selection critera of 12 months actual demand history VSL requirements
were computed for some 16,000 items. The results are summarized below:
Gross VSL Dollar Net VSL* Dollar
No*. Items. Inve s tment __Ipvestment-
16,000 $22,623,038 $5,490,581
Gross Fixed 60
Day Safety Level Net Fixed 60 Day*
Inves tment.. Investment
$22 ? 030 5 766 $6,370,62^
This simulation test illustrates that for the 16,000 items in question
conversion from a fixed to variable safety level could be accomplished
with a net reduction in total investment of approximately $900,000 when
compared to a fixed 60 day safety level, andprovide an improvement in
"service w for those items which have significant military essentiality.
The results of this test confirm the desirability of conversion to a
variable policy from a fixed policy for two principal reasons:
(1) Assuring desired item effectiveness versus an average
system effectiveness
.
(2) Obtaining the desired effectiveness with reduced
total investment in safety stocks.
There is an assumption which may be drawn from this test which
the facts will not support. That assumption is that conversion to
economic inventory programs can always be accomplished with total dollar
savings. This is not necessarily true. The Project 65 Action Officer,
Mr. Goldfinger, points this fact out in his study"
A popular conception is that additional dollars are
required initially to install variable levels of supply.
Actually, the main questions involved in the funding impact
of EIP ares
After applying system assets
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Where did the inventory manager start from
in terms of his pre-SIP levels of supply?
If his operating and safety levels were very
shallow, it is likely he will want to invest
more in inventories a
c. What "protection level," "confidence level,"
or other supply performance target is he
setting in connection with safety levels?
The higher it is, the more money it takes
.
Depending upon where it is set, variable
safety levels can cost more than, the same
as, or less than previous fixed safety
levels ."
Mr» Goldfinger suggests that cue possible solution to the funding
problem is to have inventory managers employ variable levels of supply
within existing funding availability with subsequent adjustments which
recognize differences in mission and commodity essentiality., He goes
en to point out the difficulty in evaluating the performance of EIP
systems because of inability to segregate other concurrent actions,
but concludes that generally simulations have been favorable to the EIP
systems
o
The analysis which has been made of the principles, concepts, and
various models for computing variable safety levels, indicate that these
advanced decision rules are superior to the traditional fixed policies.
From a practical viewpoint there appears to be no reason for a delay in
implementation of a standard model . There is evidence to indicate that
the individual commodity manager can do a more effective job with these
tools . Here again adoption of a standard model for all inventory managers
will permit Bureau or Headquarters evaluation of performance and budget
requests on a common basis. As in the case of the economic ordering
policy (EOQ) , these advanced techniques cannot be applied to all items
in the inventory . For example, new items entering the system will lack
3%FR Project 65—EIP Report, ^£» cit.
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demand data which would permit statistical measure for computation of
a valid variation in demand essential to VSL policy. The handling of
insurance type items, major end items, perishable and seasonal items,
all require the development of specialized handling for most efficient
commodity management » BuSandA should not only prescribe a standard VSL
model to be incorporated in the automated IGP and stock point programs,
but must develop and specify the confidence levels it desires for each
item assigned a military essentiality code* This recommendation in
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The preceding chapters have discussed and recommended the
implementation of advanced mathematical decision rules as an aid to
more effective and economical supply support . While the primary
emphasis has been given to installation of these techniques at the NICP
or system level, there is equal validity to the use of these or similar
techniques at the stock point level „ The Navy recognized the advantages
of this concept in the development of the BuSandA Stock Tables which
permitted a manual computation of economic order and variable safety
levels for the old GA fraction. The further implementation of these
decision rules at the stock point level has been hampered by the rapid
and extensive realignment of logistic responsibilities which resulted
from the creation of the Defense Supply Agency. It is not the purpose
of this chapter to review the many and varied problems which the
creation of DSA posed for the Navy. Since becoming operational on
1 January, 1962, the DSA has, in conjunction with representatives of
BuSandA and the ONM, solved many of the more urgent problems. The
transition from a Navy logistic system based on program support to an
integrated DOD system based on commodity (FSC) support is an accomplished
fact.- The transition has been accomplished within the guidance suggested
by RAM Grumpacker, Chief BuSandA, who in 1962 answered the question of
how the creation of DSA would affect Navy logistics:
This is a major change in our way of doing business
but not a curtailment of that business. . . We in BuSandA,
in BuSandA-managed activities and in other field and fleet
supply functions have our continuing mission of doing
everything possible to improve support and readiness of our
fleet/»
Superimposing a wholesale DOD-DSA supply system on the Navy's
^B&SAndA NewsIe.tAer Vol. ZEL flfi..J£. "Eattem £px Tomorrow
This is DSA," February, 19o27
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Integrated supply system has res.. n g E*
missions and responsibilities . The Navy ;
a i'Javy Retail Supply Office,, fch< Fl« M Office
iish inventory management policy fc tl I were 1
managed by Navy TCP's and now tra DSA. 1 also
recognized the need for changes Le " - ion system
accomodate peculiar Navy problems., The Navy has long pr* - • -;.
support concept of positioning material ir t Ity lots
consumption point as practicable. This son
|
he dire Lo=
cation of material from contract to consumption r J mir g secor
destination transportation and double Depot h iling pges 9 and
minimizing transportation costs by ob n fav
bulk shipments. The decision by DSA to establish Sf Lzed Support
Depots and Direct Supply Support Points resulted in the i.
selected items and ranges of DSA owned mater. or nes i the pi i
of consumption,which not only improved supply support to Navy custc
but reduced operating costs . This decision in effect re. - . -
DSA adoption of a Navy concept which is a pi Navy integrated
supply system. Under this concept wholesale and re
together (in this case the Navy eliminates its need 1 stool
and draws on wholesale stocks directly) . The \. d ire has advantages
for both the Navy and DSA by minimizing stock ir , maximizing
supply effectiveness, and making possible m i - inherent in
direct input of material from industry to as close to the point of
ultimate use as possible.
The use of SSD°s and DSSP's has only partially solved one of -he
Navy's most perplexing problems;, i. e,,, to substitc
DSA system for the former Navy IGP "push" system. The problem can be
clarified in terms of a practical example. Prior t< rated DSi
management of common use general supply items, support responsil ties
were centered in the General Stores Supply Office, Phi phia. GSSO
was responsible for support of gem upply items b
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the Navy. Under the Navy sup; oncept, wholesale stc - -ire
maintained at several types of supply activities
points, primary, and secondary stock points . The NSC Norfolk is an
example of a major primary stock point being responsible for support
of all off-shore Atlantic area and European activities as well as
satellited stock points. In addition, local I ivities including retail
issues to ships were supported by Norfolk, Norfolk stc « eplenisl
on the basis of periodic stock status reports forwarded tc GSSC
resulted in replenishment of Norfolk stocks either through redistribution
or procurement action. The levels of stock maintained at N f IV m
based en stockage objectives prescribed by BuSar .
With the creation of the Single Manage" concept the general supply
items were transferred from the Navy's ICP (GCSO) tc g <
Defense Supply Center (DGSC). Prior to the implementation cf the SSD
and DSP distribution pattern „ NSC Norfolk I a "puller" requisition-
ing on the wholesale system. The transfer of the bulk of the GSSO mi
to DSA resulted in the disestablishment of I . . . ih a sma .
nucleus of its personnel being incorporated in the former Milits
Industrial Supply Agency. The subsequent transfer of MISA to DSA Lefi
the Navy with an inadequate requirements comj Ltation capability fc
"retail" stock levels; e. g, GSSO formerly "pushed" general stores it<
to NSC Norfolk; the NSC was now responsible ici determining "when" and
in what quantities to "pull" material from DSA. The subsequent
ment and gradual operational capability build-uj of the FM30 has -
to re-establish and re-assign this es i! fun I on, It was
Navy's fear that a completely centralized DSA wholesale distribute
system with stocks positioned at predominately inland Army General T> -.
would not provide a sufficiently flexible and responsive system in
to satisfy ship turn-around time and industrial schedules in a timely
manner. The principal factor which further complicated the Navy's
ability to maintain adequate retail stocks was the severe limitations
placed on NSF obligation authority. NSF funds were reduced in ord-
^3

provide initial working capital in the Defense Stock Fund. For these
reasons the Wavy proposed to DOD and DSA integration of the C0NU3 Navy
and DSA supply distribution systems in much the same manner as inte~
gration of the wholesale and retail echelons had been effected within
the Navy The subsequent designation of some SSD and D3SP activities
has provided the Navy in part with the level of supply support which
is essential to the readiness of its ships and priority weapon systems,
A recent brochure released by the Chief BuSandA describes in detail the
negotiations between Navy and DSA representatives which resulted in the
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partial integration of the DSA wholesale and Navy retail systems
.
The brochure summarizes the Navy position as fellows:
DSA has, to a greater extent than the Navy, the
resources to perform this function (supply support of
fleet and major overhaul activities), DSA is composed of
capable and responsible military and civilian personnel,
and there is every reason to believe that DSA can and will
support Navy combatant forces in an outstanding manner,^
The partial integration of the Navy retail and DSA wholesale
supply systems by stocking DSA owned material at many Navy retail
activities has provided effective support at those activities for
items which have been designated for centralized inventory control and
stockage. However, these procedures are only applicable to those items
which are designated 3SC 1 (Supply Status Code l). As discussed in
Chapter III each DSC is responsible for determining whether centralized
or decentralized management is most economical to the government. When
a decision is made to designate an item as warranting decentralized
management current DOD-DSA procedures require that the item be offered
to the General Services Administration for a management determination
(refer to DOD INST, 4140,7 and DSA Regulation 4140.2), In addition
special referral procedures apply to any item on which the GSA is a
^ Integrated Navy/ Defense Sjjjpj&ly; Agency Supply. Systems ? Chief




registered federal catalog user. The DSA-G3A referral ; jgran has
resulted in each of the DSC's offering i,,nd C3A a tic le
number of items. In addition, a decision Cy the Assistant St
cf Defense (I & L) in 1963 resulted in transfer of all common Hand Tools
(FSG 51) and Paints, Lacquers, and Thinners (FSG 80) GSA. This
logistic transfer could involve from 40, 000-50 »00G items when eomp3 ed.
Items which have been designated for decentralized manage; ave
imposed an additional burden on the Navy Retail System. These iteo
are not available through the normal DSA requisitioning channels,, but
must be obtained either from a GSA source (Regional Depot. Federal Sl;
Schedule, or National Buying Program) or from local purchase, A recent
visit was made to the Naval Supply Center Oakland qclore this
problem further. The Naval Supply Center Oakland is the principal
Navy Stock Point for WestPac extra-CONUS demands and has assumed a DSA
mission as a Specialized Support Depot. Discussion with management
personnel in the Control Department was extremely revealing. These
personnel are particularly concerned with the impact which the myriad
of logistic transfers have had on the operating level. They
;
that assumption of the DSA mission had required a complete reorganizai
of stock and receipt control personnel along DSC lines. They poin -
that additional missions had been assumed under severly limited person
ceilings which in fact had been reduced in recen' Personnel
particularly concerned with the volume of cognizance changes. A by]
example was a recent directive from the Ordnance Supply Office requiring
cognizance transfers which had not teen accomplished before a second
change had been received,
Discussion with the supervisor of the decentralized (SSC-2) item
stock control battery revealed that approximately 26,000 items --re
currently managed with more than half the items procured through the GSA.
^3a report published by the GSA titled "Supply Support to D0D
Monthly Status Report"dated September 19&2 indicated that four DSC's
(DGSC





An indication of the magnitude of the management problem is provided
by the estimated annual sales and procurement program for these items.
Since the primary purpose of the visit was to explore the possible appli=
cation of advanced decision rules and obtain demand data for a simulation
study, the supervisor was questioned as to the present decision rules
employed in managing this program, A procurement program of over
$11,000,000 would appear to warrant the application of advanced decision
rules. The criteria for maintaining stock levels on decentralized items
is provided by the FMSO, FMSO publishes its guidance in FMSO Instruction
P 4400.12 A» Part I - Introduction - outlines the apparent anamoly of
the decentralized management problem;
One of the major results of the establishment of
the Defense Supply Agency and the expanded application
of integrated material management has been the reversion
to local inventory management responsibility of many stocks
of material formerly managed by Navy inventory control
points. **
In essence the DOD-GSA referral program resulted in a major
"requirements pull" problem at Navy retail stock points for these
decentralized items. Based on the NSC Oakland NSF budget for these
decentralized items (SSC 2) amounting to approximately $12,000,000, it-
is readily apparent that the major retail stock points are responsiole
for a major segment of FMSO's total NSF budget.
Stocking activities have always been responsible
for the management of a portion of their inventory, and
most smaller supply departments have never operated in any
other way* Nonetheless, with the advent of DSA and G3A on
the military supply logistics scene, the proportion of Navy
^Personal correspondence between the authors and Cdr. Wo N.
Schneider, SO, U3N, Deputy Control Department Supervisor. FMSO allotted
$11,655,741 (small portion of total for local repair) supporting annual
sales of $11,138,640.
^3FMS0 INSTRUCTION P 4400.12 A, Subj : Navy retail management of
nedjcal , general, iMa&tri£l.» aut^stive , construction, Ba^ka&ed. BfiLtsoJl&uji
m& chemical Items, under cognizance gjvmbols "21. " "KZ, " "£A, " "££, " arid
"2i"; 3ji5,t£ualloJls for , dated October 4, 1963.
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financial obligations made locally has almost tripled.
Specifically, on 30 June I960, with medical as the
single manager s approximately $100 million v i for
locally by stock points for procurement both of decontrc I sd
items and for local purchase of centrally manage- . >ems«
Just three years later, on 30 June 1963, approximately $270
million fell into this category
»
A procurement program of this magnitude would certainly wan r * the
utilization of the most economic and efficient supply decision rules,. A
review of FMSO's supply decision rules for inventory management indie
-
that rather than a variable economic inventory policy fixed replenish
ment decision rules are specified , It is under-: FMSO is
presently testing a V3L Model at MCAS Cherry Point, which,, if proven
satisfactory, may be implemented system wide- For the computation of
replenishment requirements a fixed stockage objective of five (5) monl
is used. The stockage objective is broken down into a three (3) mon hs
operating level, one (l) month order and ship time and a fixed safety
level of one (l) month. It is noted that the Instruction authorizes the
use of the BuSandA EOQ Stock Tables ; however, at the operator's level EOQ
Tables are not being used. The stock control personnel of NSC Oakland
indicated that they were not using EOQ because of lack of NSF procu e
ment funds. The personnel also indicated that requirements studies
generated by their computer invariably required manual adjustment of
order quantities. These changes were caused by necessary revisions to
average demand which resulted from system realignment of customer act
.
ties. Because of these changes each historical demand must be analyzed
to insure its future validity. It is interesting to note that regard
of the requirements system employed (fixed or variable) computations
would have required adjustment because of the changes in demand data.
It was the purpose of this visit not only to discuss advanced sup]
decision rules with the operators, but to obtain data on which a simu-
lation study could be made. It soon became apparent that such a
4 '6Supply Managemenl &sj2&j3^&&14»ty_, £px J££snff.& SupjpIy,, Mgncx ]
enclosure (l) to Chief BuSandA ltr S13»33 dtd 12 Feb I96k„
1*7

simulation was not feasible due to the changes in the basic ground
rules which have occurred almost continuously since the inception of
DSA» The authors reviewed several requirements computations and found
that in every case the demand data on which the machine computation was
based could not be accepted. Gdr. Schneider pointed out that the change
in NSC Oakland's status (i. e„, recent designation as a DSA 3SP) had
materially affected their ability to recreate transactions or run audit
trails o A visit to an activity such as NSC Oakland clearly points cut
the problem and difficulties faced by the operator in implementing any
supply decision rules . Changes imposed upon changes make it impossible
to institute and evaluate supply management decision rules , This fact
of life should not„ however, preclude the implementation of advanced
rules which are known and have been proven to be more effective and
economical o Such is the case with the basic EOQ and the VSL. NSC
Oakland has a substantial computer capability as do the major Navy Retail
Stock Points. This capability is being increased within a few months
under the Uniform ADP installation. As previously pointed out, advanced
supply decision rules are particularly susceptible to computer appli-
cation. The DSA & DOD decisions which have substantially increased the
requirements determination for decentralized items at the Retail Stock
Point level, emphasized the necessity for implementing better decision
rules . This problem cannot be solved solelyby the operators. There
must be guidance and assistance from a higher level. This places the
responsibility firmly at the policy level, not only for the development
of advanced models, but for communicating and selling their real value
to the operator. Too often EOQ is lightly dismissed and placed in the
category of "too expensive." The policy maker is in a position to prove
to the operator that EOQ and VSL will provide the maximum effective
support for each dollar invested in inventory. It must be recognized
that any system of replenishment, regardless of its nature, cannot be
truly effective if the basic guidelines under which it operates are
constantly changing. The progress in integrating the Navy retail, and
DSA wholesale systems is at the point where future operations should be
4-8

less erratic. The management problem at NSC Oakland 5 Lling
26,000 items with the expectation of this nur
ing, again emphasizes the need fo iecisior rules. T; -
Uniform. ADP installation again is a logical vehicle to form
advanced decision rules at all the major retail stock points,, It i s
recommended that personnel of the FflSO cooj
are many workable models in use today which could be ad |
implementation at the stock points. Several f 4|-e^ models have been
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